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THE LEGAL SITUATION AS OF THE DATE OF STATE SUCCESSION
As a result of the demise of the three Communist Federations in Central
and Eastern Europe a number of maritime independent States have appeared
or reappeared with a longer or shorter coastline. They are: the Russian
Federation, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY").
Among them the longest coastline, after the Bussian Federation, have
Croatia and Ukraine.
The maritime delimitations between States with adjacent or opposite
coasts pose some specific problems as compared with the determination of
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land frontiers.l The purpose of this article is to describe the problems of
this kind in the relations between Croatia and its neighbouring coastal
States.
In this respect important is the situation as it was at the "critical date"
which is the date of the succession of States.z According to the Opinion
No.11 of the Arbitration Commission of the International Conference on
the Former Yugoslavia of 16 July 1993, that date for Croatia and Slovenia
is 8 October 1991, and for the FRY 27 April 1992.3
The former Yugoslav Federation ("SFRY") had at that critical date its
internal waters between its coast and the fringe of its islands, encompassed
by straight baselines. These straight baselines were traced by its Law on
the Coastal Sea, Contiguous Zone and Continental Shelf of 1965.4 Their
advantage along the Croatian coast - which were necessarily drawn by a
unilateral act of the former State - is that since 1965 Italy has never
protested against them. Slovenia and the FRY cannot challenge them now
1 See on maritime boundaries and delimitations in general - Davorin RUDOLF:
Medunarodno prauo mora finternational Law of the Sea/, Zagreb 1985, pp.61-75, 107-109,
191-194, 213-216, 224-225, 239-252, 270-291; Ren6-Jean DUPIIY - Daniel VIGNES (6d.).:
Traitd du nouueau droit de la mer, Paris 198b, (Lucius Caflisch), pp.B7b-440; V.Dj.DEGAN:
"O granicama na prostorima mora, morskog dna i podzemlja" /On frontiers at sea, seabed
and its subsoil/, Uporedno pomorsko prauo - Comparatiue Maritime Law 1991, No.3-4,
pp.l75-214. See about practice of international courts and tribunals in maritime delimitations
- V.D.DEGAN: "Equitable Principles in Maritime Delimitations", Le droit international d
I'heure de sa codification, Etudes en l'honneur de Roberto Ago, vol.Il, Milano (Giuffrd) 1987,
pp.107-137; Prosper WEIL: Perspectiues du droit de la ddlimitation maritime, Paris 1988,
passim; V.D.DEGAN: "Kriteriji razgranidenja morskih prostora izmedu drZava" /Criteria of
delimitation of maritime spaces between States/, Uporedno pomorsho prauo i pomorsha
hupoprodaja 7983, No.100, pp.43-86; "Razgranidenja morskih prostora u medunarodnoj sudskoj
i arbitraZnoj praksi" Maritime delimitations in the practice of international courts and
tribunals/, Uporedno pomorsho prduo - Comparatiue Maritime Law 1994, No.1-4, pp.33-76.
2 Cf., the 1986 Judgment by the Chamber of the Hague Court on the Frontier Dispute,
(Burkina FasoMali), LC.J. Reports 1986, p.568, para. 30; p.570, para.33; p.597, para.8l. The
1992 Judgment by the Chamber of the Court on Land, Island and Maritime Frontiers, (El
SalvadorlHonduras; Nicaragua intervening), discussed even a sequence of critical dates. The
frrst is that of uti possidefis, and the subsequent ones arising from ensuing adjudication or
a boundary treaty, even if established on the same principle. Cf,, I.C.J. Reports 7992, p.40L,
para.67.
3 Cf., International Legal Materials 1993, No.6, p. 1589. See on the dilemma about
dates of State succession for various successor States of the former SFRY - V.D.DEGAN:
"State Succession - Especially in Respect of State Property and Debts", The Finnish Yearbooh
of International Law 1993, pp.180-183; "Kontinuitet i sukcesija dri,ava u pogledu drZavne i
dru5tvene imovine" /Continuity and succession of States in respect of State and social property/,
Financijska praksa 1993, No.S (Zagreb), pp.438-439.
4 Zakon o obalnom moru, vanjskom morskom pojasu i epikontinentalnom pojasu
Jugoslavije "SluZbeni list SFR.I", No.22l1965. These straight baselines were slightly corrected
on the Montenegrin coast by its latter Law of 23 July 1987 ("SluZbeni list SFILI", No.49/1987.
A new straight baseline was drawn between the cap Mendra near the port of Bar (Antivari)
and the cap Platamuni near Budva. This correction has no impact on future delimitations
in regard to the opposite Italian coast.
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because they were themselves until respectively 1991 and 1992 parts of
the SFRY.
From these straight baselines the SFRY extended in 1979 its territorial
sea up to t2 nautical miles.5 The same breadth of territorial sea has Italy
pursuant to its Law of 14 August 1974.
Even more important is the Agreement between the Government of the
SFRY and the Government of the Republic Italy on delimitation of the
Continental Shelf, signed on 8 January 1968, and entered into force on
2t January 1970.6
Italy delimited its territorial sea with the SFRY in the Gulf of Trieste
by the Treaty of Osimo, signed on 10 November L975 and entered into
force on 2 April 1977.7 Thus Italy had all its maritime frontiers with
Yugoslavia fixed. On the contrary, between the former Yugoslavia and
Albania no agreement had been concluded on delimitation of either the
territorial sea or the continental shelf.
Since 28 January 1966 the former SFRY was a party to all four 1958
Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea.8 On Article 6 of the Convention
on the Continental Shelf it expressed a reservation according to which: in
determining its continental shelf, Yugoslavia recognizes no "special
circumstances" which should influence that delimitation.
The Assembly of the SFRY ratified the L982 UN Law of the Sea
Convention on 27 November 1985. The instruments of ratification were
deposited with the UN Secretary-General on 5 May 1986. This Convention
entered into force for a1l its contracting States only on 16 November 1994.
At that date the SFRY no longer existed.
Since 17 December L964 Italy is a party to the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the High Seas and to that on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, but not to that on the Continental Shelf. Albania is since 7 December
L964 a party only to the conventions on the High Seas and on the
Continental Shelf.
5 Cf., Zakon o izmjenama Zakona o obalnom moru, vanjskom morskom pojasu i
epikontinentalnom pojasu Jugoslavije (d1.5), "SluZbeni list SFR"I", No.13/1979.
6 Cf., Sporazum izmedu Made Socijalistidke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije i Vlade
Repubiike ltalije o razgranidenju epikontinentalnog pojasa izmedu dvije zemlje, "SluZbeni list
SFzu, Medunarodni ugovori i drugi sporazumi", No.28/1970.
7 "SluZbeni iist SFzu, Medunarodni ugovori", No.U1977.
8 The matter is of: Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone;
Convention on the High Seas; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas; and Convention on the Continental Shelf; all done at Geneva on 29 April
1958.
v. D. Degan: Maritime Frontiers of the Republic of croatia, Irpp v. 87., (1.-4.), z-Bg, (1995)
Having gained its independence, Croatia enacted its Maritime code on
27 January 1994.e This Code contains in its Articles 33 to 42 provisions
on the Croatian exclusive economic zone. However, according to its Article
L042 the Sabor (Parliament) of the Republic of Croatia will subsequently
proclaim it by its decision. Therefore, at present no coastal State in the
Adriatic possesses its exclusive economic zorte. Italy is strongly opposed to
such proclamations throughout the Mediterranean. Slovenia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina are in an unfavourable geographic position that they cannot
possess it, nor the continental shelf.
On 3 August 1992 Croatia notified to the UN Secretary General its
succession to the three 1958 Geneva Conventions, with the sole exception
of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas. Previously, on 6 JuIy L992, Slovenia did the same in
regard to the conventions on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
and on the High Seas.
Finally, on 14 September 1995 Croatia notified its succession in regard
to the L982 UN Law of the Sea Convention.l0 At present all coastal States
of the Adriatic are parties to that Convention, with the sole exception of
Albania.ll
THE APPLICABLE LEGAL RULES
To such situations involving the drawing of maritime boundaries by
new States in the process of State succession a number of legal principles
apply. Most of these principles have been ascertained in the practice of
international courts and tribunals and so far they have not been a matter
of codification trough conventions. Some of them apply to any maritime
delimitation whatsoever. 12
The first legal principle of a very broad character is that "the land
9 Pomorski zakonik, "Narodne novine, Sluibeni Iist Republike Hrvatske", No.l7ltggl.
10 Cf,, "Narodne novine, Medunarodni ugovori", No.11/1995.' It was wrong to claim in
that act that Croatia has been a "party" to this Convention as from 8 October 1991. That
is because the Convention itself entered into force only on 16 November 1994. Until then
all States which had ratified it or acceded to it, or notified their succession to it, had the
status of "contracting States". See Article 2, paragraph 1 (f) and (g) of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. By the same act Croatia adhered to the Agreement
relating to the implementation of Part XI of that Convention.
11 Parties to the Convention are Ermong other States: the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina
since its entering into force on 16 November 1994; Italy since 13 January 1995; Croatia
since 5 April 1995; and Slovenia since 16 June 1995.
L2 See on adjacency or contiguity as the legal title in the law of the sea - Gilbert
APOLLIS: L'emprise maritime de I'Etat cdtier, Paris 1981, pp.33-82; and especially in maritime
delimitations - Prosper WEIL, op.cit., n.1, pp.55-61.
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dominates the sear',l3 or in other words:
"...it is the land which confers upon the coastal State a right to
the waters off its coast..."l4
Therefore, no claim of a State is lawful which seeks a portion of the
sea which is not adjacent to the coast under its sovereignty. The maritime
areas are but an accessory to the coast and they cannot as such be an
object of occupation, cession or sales.15
The foregoing also means that what is important for maritime delimitation
is to exactly know the point where the land frontier between two
neighbouring States intersects the coastline. From that point is drawn the
maritime boundary of their territorial sea and continental shelf, as well
as of their contiguous zone or exclusive economic zotte if they proclaimed
them.
As to the settlement of territorial disputes on the land, the practice of
international courts and tribunals has attached a great importance to the
principle of uti possidetis.L6 This means that an internal demarcation of
13 Cl, Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 20 February 1969 on North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v. Denmark and the Netherlands), I.C.J.Reports 1969,
p.52, par.96. This principle was subsequently confirmed by the following decisions of the
Hague Court: the Judgment of L9 December 1978 on the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
(Greece v. Turkey), Reports 1978, p.37, par.86; the Judgment of 24 February L982 on
Continental Shelf (Libya v. Tunisia), Reports 1982, p.67, par.73; and the Judgment of the
Chamber of the Court of 12 October 1984 on the Gulf of Maine Area case (Canada v. the
United States), Reports 1984, pp.313-314, par.157.
L4 Cf,, Judgment of the Hague Court of 18 December 1951 in Fisheries cose (United
KingdomNorway), I.C.J. Reports 1951, p.133. Much before that Judgment, the Permanent
Court of Arbitration invoked in its Award of 14 March 1908 in Grisbadarna case (Norway/Sweden):
"principes fondamentaux du droit des gens, tant ancien que moderne, d'aprds lesquels le
territoire maritime est une d6pendance n6cessaire d'un territoire terrestre", Reports of
International Arbitral Awards, United Nations, vol.Xl, p.159. That principle was confirmed
in the Decision of the Beagle Channel Arbitration (Argentina/Chile) of 22 April L977,
International Legal Materials 1977, No.3, pp.672-673, par.L07; etc.
15 In the spirit of this rule the Hague Court defined in its Judgment of 1969 "as the
most important of all rules of law relating to the continental shelf'; that of its non-encroachment
on the natural prolongation of the land territory under the sea of the other State (/.C.J.
Reports 1969, p.22, para.19; p.47, para.85(c)). That legal rule did not prove to be very useful
in actual delimitations of the continental shelf.
16 Cf,, Hildebrando ACCIOLY: Tratado de direito internacional prtblico,2.a edigao, Vol.II,
Rio de Janeiro 1956, pp.128-130; Georg SCHWARZENBERGER: International Law, YoI.l,
International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Third Edition, London
1957, pp.21, 304-305; D.P. O'CONNELL: International Law, Vol.One, London 1965, pp.49L-492;
A.O. CUKWURAH: The Settlernent of Bound.ary Disputes in International Law, Manchester
1967, pp.1L2-LL6, 190-199; Charles ROUSSEAU: Droit international public, Tome III, Les
comp6tences, Paris L977, pp.238-240; Benedetto CONFORTI: Diritto internazionale, Qaatta
edizione, Napoli 1992, p.llZ; NGTIYEN Quoc Dinh, Patrick DAILLIER, Alain PELLET: Droit
international public, 5e 6dition, Paris 1994, pp.461-463, 496 et 502.
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boundary lines within the predecessor State valid at the critical date, or
a delimitation with territories of a third State in force at the same date,
is accepted as a basis for all kinds of settlements of territorial disputes
between the respective neighbouring States.
The Chamber of the International Court of Justice has proclaimed the
principle of uti possidetis, in its Judgment of 22 December 1g8O in the
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), to be of general scope:
"...It is a general principle, which is logically connected with the
phenomenon of obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. Its
obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new
States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the
challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering
Power'"17
It should however be stressed that the said principle is not a peremptory
norm of general international law (jus cogerus). The newly independent
States which have previously been parts of a colonial empire - or other
new States arisen from the dissolution of the predecessor State - can
determine their boundaries at their free will. That is however subject to
the strict condition of reaching a free and equal agreement on new
boundaries.
But whenever an agreement to the contrary is not reached, the principle
of uti possideti.s imposes as obligatory. It therefore suffices that one of
neighbouring States declines the claim of the other for the change of
former internal or international boundaries for this principle to become
immediately applicable.
In these circumstances, the Chamber of the Hague Court has accorded
pre-eminence of the legal title from this principle at a fixed date even
over effective possession as a basis of sovereignty,l8 and over the principle
of self-determination of "peoples" in Africa.19
There were, however, attempts to prove the inapplicability of the principle
of uti possidetis on maritime delimitations between newly independent
States in Africa. In a dispute on delimitation of maritime frontier with
Senegal, Guinea-Bissau pleaded the absence of such cases on the succession
of States in practice. The agreements between former colonial powers on
17 I.C.J. Reports 1986, p.565, para.2O.
18 "...The first aspect, emphasized by the Latin genitiveTurls, is found in the pre-eminence
accorded to legal title over effective possession as a basis of sovereignty..." Ibid., p.56G,
para.23.
19 "...The essential requirement of stability in order to survive, to develop and gradually
to consolidate their independence in all fields, has induced African Statei judiciously to
consent to the respecting of colonial frontiers, and to take account of it in the interpretation
of the principle of self-determination of peoples.' Ibid., p.567, para.21.
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maritime frontiers were extremely rare and, unlike land frontiers, by these
agreements were fixed boundaries only in some domains, like fishery rights
or exploitation of natural resources.
By its Award of 31 July 1989 the Arbitral Tribunal dismissed these
arguments and decided that an Agreement on maritime boundary concluded
on 26 April 1960 by an exchange of letters between France and Portugal,
was obligatory for Guinea-Bissau.20 That for following reasons:
"...La d6limitation du domaine de validit6 spatial de I'Etat peut
concerner Ia surface terrestre, les eaux fluviales ou lacustres, Ia mer,
le sous-sol ou l'atmosphdre. Dans tous les cas, le but des trait6 est
le m6me: d6terminer d'une manidre stable et permanente le domaine
de validit6 spatial des normes juridiques de I'Etat. D'un point de
vue juridique il n'existe aucune raison d'6tablir des r6gimes diff6rents
selon l'6l6ment mat6riel of Ia limite est fix6e..."21
Such treaties on maritime boundaries to which the uti possidetis principle
applies, were concluded sometimes by the predecessor State with a third
State. In case of the former Yugoslav Federation the matter is of the
already cited Agreement with Italy of 1968 on delimitation of the Continental
Shelf, as well as the 1975 Treaty of Osimo by which a boundary of
territorial sea was drawn in the Gulf of Trieste.
However, quite exceptional, and to our knowledge non-existent, are
enactments of a predecessor State, or of a former Colonial Power, by
which were drawn maritime boundaries between member States of a former
Federation or sub-divisions of the larger colonial possessions. That is
because the competence in maritime areas is as a rule reserved for the
central State authority. This situation resulted in a regime sui generls in
the Gulf of Fonseca, of which will be some more word bellow'
Nevertheless, even if a treaty with a third State or an internal enactment
on maritime delimitation exists, it does not grve the title of sovereignty
by virtue of the principle of uti possidetis in all possible circumstances.
As stressed above, the respective States are always free to agree otherwise.
On the other hand., the principle according to which it is the land which
confers upon the coastal State a right to the waters off its coast, could
overrule such a previous delimitation.
Supposedly, the former Yugoslav Federal bodies conferred by an act
their federal prerogatives in the Bay of Pirano only on Croatian, or only
on Slovene police and other local authorities. In these circumstances, that
20 That Agreement defined the maritime boundary between the
that time an autonomous State within the French Communautd) and
of Guinea.
2l Cf., Reuue gdndrale de droit international public 1990, No'l,
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would not be a sufficient title that the other coastal State in that Bay
remains without areas of its territorial sea adjacent to its coast. In such
a situation, the respective coastal State could lawfully decline the effects
of the principle of uti possidetis.
Having all the above in view, tfru ,Lf*, on Iand and. maritime delimitations
in the process of State succession are best summarized in Opinion No.3
of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia of 11
January 1992.
As for the question put by Serbia: "Are the internally drawn demarcation
lines between Croatia and Serbia, and between Serbia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, frontiers in terms of international public law?", the Commission
has in its answer in four points resolved all the problems that may arise:
"First - All external frontiers must be respected in line with the
principle stated in the United Nations Charter, in the Declaration
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXD) and in
the Helsinki Final Act, a principle which also underlines Article 11
of the Vienna Convention of 23 August 1978 on the Succession of
States in Respect of Treaties."22
Therefore, this principle also imposes a duty on third neighbouring
States, in case of a dissolution of a predecessor State, to respect the
frontiers between them and the respective successor States. Hence, this is
also a legal obligation of Italy, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece
and Albania to respect the frontiers as these existed at the date of the
succession of States with Slovenia, Croatia, the FRY, and with Macedonia.
"Second - The boundaries between Croatia and Serbia, between
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, and possibly between other adjacent
independent States may not be altered except by .agreement freely
arrived at."
The above principle confirms the conclusion that there are no unilateral
drawings of borderlines by . new State on whatever ground. Consequently,
even the principle uti possidetis is not the rule of jus cogens.
22 That provision on Boundary regimes, provides: 'A succession of States does not as
such affect: - (a) a boundary established by a treaty; or (b) obligations and rights established
by a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary." Of similar scope is Article 62 of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. According to its paragraph 2 (a), a
fundamental change of circumstances "may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from a treaty: (a) if a treaty establishes a boundary...".
L4
"Third - Except where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries
become frontiers protected by international law. This conclusion
follows from the principle of respect for the territorial status quo
and, in particular, from the principle of uti possidetis. Uti possidetis,
though initially applied in settling decolonization issues in America
and Africa, is today recognized as a general principle, as stated by
the International Court of Justice in its Judgment of 22 December
1986 in the case between Burkina Faso and Mali (Frontier Dispute,
(1986) ICJ Reports 554 at 566)....
The principle applies all the more readily to the Republics since
the second and fourth paragraphs of Article 5 of the Constitution
of the SFRY stipulated that the Republics' territories and boundaries
could not be altered without their consent."
Although the second paragraph does not seem to be of particular
importance in the light of the dualistic approach adopted by the Arbitration
Commission on the relationship between international law and the law of
the Former Yugoslav Federation, it can be of some use in case that a
former Republic should now aspire to change boundaries with another
Republic, as they were at the date of State succession.
"Fourth - According to a well established principle of international
law the alteration of existing frontiers or boundaries by force is not
capable of producing any tegal effect. This principle is to be found,
for instance, in the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (General Assembly
resolution 2625 OOW)) and in the Helsinki Final Act; it was cited
by the Hague Conference on ? September 1991 and is enshrined in
the draft Convention of 4 November 1991 drawn up by the Conference
on Yugoslavia."2S
The latest statement is but a positive expression of the above rule that
the boundaries between two independent States may not be altered except
by an agreement freely arrived at. Unilateralism by t}:e successor States
cannot be a valid legal basis for settlernent of terriLorial disputes of any
kind.
It follows that the principle of uti possicletis respects tu'o kinds of
former boundaries. The first are internationai frontiers between the
predecessor State and a third State (or between tvro former coionial empires
15
23 Cf., International Legal Materials 1992, No.6, p.I500.
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in Latin America and Africa). Such a situation is involved in the first
above quoted paragraph in Opinion No.3 of the Arbitration Commission
when relating to "all external frontiers".
Of equal importance for delimitations are the internal boundaries or
"demarcation lines" between entities within the predecessor State, or within
a larger colonial possession, which become independent States. To this
kind of boundaries relate the second and the third above quoted paragraphs.
Since a situation like this is relevant to the delimitation between Croatia
and other successor States of the former SFRY, it should be discussed in
some more detail.
In this respect the principle of uti possidetis rs not the same as the
acquisitive prescription, which is a mode of acquisition of a terca nullius,
or even of the creation of a historic title over waters in a b.y which
should otherwise be a part of the high seas. Such a title appears as a
result of "the continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty
(peaceful in relation to other States)",24 or in other words, which is
generally acquiesced by other States.
The key aspect of the principle of uti possidetis is, however, the denial
of the possibility of terra nullius.25 Therefore, in application of this principle
there is no possibility of prescription in occupation of a territory without
title. Subject to above conditions, the principle of uti possidetis can itself
be a basis for a valid title of sovereignty.
In the above cited Judgment of the Chamber of the Hague Court of
1986 on the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Fasoffali), the following was said,
especially in regard to "the critical date":
"...International law - and consequently the principle of uti possidetis
- applies to the new State (as a State) not with retroactive effect,
but immediately and from the moment onwards. It applies to the
State as it is, i.e. to the "photograph" of the territorial situation
then existing. The principle of uti possidetis freezes the territorial
title; it stops the clock, but does not put back the hands... French
law - especially legislation enacted by France for its colonies and
tercitoires d'outre n1.er - may play a role not in itself... but only as
one factual element among others, or as evidence indicative of what
has been called "colonial heritage", i.e. the "photograph of the territory"
at the critical date."26
This statement was in a way supplemented by a dictum from the 1992
24 Cf., the Arbitral Award by Max Huber,in Island of Palmas Case (the NetherlandsAl.S.A.)
of 4 April 1928, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol.Il, pp.839, 867-868.
25 Cf., I.C.J. Reports 1992, p.387, para.AZ; p.558, para.333; and pp.564-566, para.343-347
26 I.C.J. Reports 1986, p.568, para.30.
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Judgment by the Chamber of the Court on Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute (El SalvadoriHonduras, Nicaragua intervening):
"...when the principle of the uti possidetis juris is involved, the
jus referred to is not international law but the constitutional or
administrative law of the pre-independence sovereign, in this case
Spanish colonial law; and it is perfectly possible that that law itself
gave no clear and definite answer to the appurtenance of marginal
areas... For this reason, it is particularly appropriate to examine the
conduct of the new States... during the period immediately after
independence. Claims then made, and the reaction - or lack of
reaction - to them may throw light on the contemporary appreciation
of what the situation in 182L had been, or should be taken to have
been..."27
Generally speaking, the circumstances in which the principle of uti
possid,eti.s is applied in a settlement of territorial disputes vary very much
in practice.
The lapse of time between the "critical date" of the acquisition of
independence and the date of establishing the delimitation lines by a
judicial body can create tremendous problems of evidence. Hence, on the
basis of uti possid.etis as in 1.82L the frontier was traced between Guatemala
and Honduras by the Arbitral Award issued on 23 January 1933.28 The
same was the legal basis of the Judgment in the Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, which was issued on
11 September lgg2, 172 years after the acquisition of independence of
States in Central America.29
The Judgment by the Chamber of the Hague Court on the Frontier
Dispute between Burkina Faso and MaIi of 22 December 1986 offers in
some aspects even a more peculiar situation. In former times both States
were colonies within the French West Africa. Mali gained its independence
in 1960 under the name of the Federation of MaIi, succeeding the Sudanese
Republic which had emerged, in 1959 from an overseas territory called
French Sudan.
Upper Volta came into being in 1919 but was then abolished in 1932,
and again reconstituted by a law of 4 September t947, which stated that
the boundaries of "the re-established territory of Upper Volta" were to be
"those of the former colony of Upper Volta on 5 September 1932". It was
27 I.C.J. Reports 1992, p.559, para.333.
28 See - Reports of International Arbitral Awards, (RIAA), vol.Il, pp.131ff.
29 On the basis of uti possidelzs as in 1810 the territorial dispute was settled between
Bolivia and Peru by an Arbitral Award of 9 July 1909 (RIAA, vol.Xl, pp.139f0, as well as
that between Columbia and Venezuela by the Award of 24 March 1922 (ibid. vol.I, pp.223f0.
\7
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this reconstituted Upper Volta which subsequently obtained independence
in 1960 and took the name of Burkina F aso in 1984.
That dispute was settled on the basis of uti possidetis as of 5 September
t932.
AIso should be in this framework mentioned the Judgment of the Hague
Court of 3 February 1994 on Territorial Dispute between Libya and Chad.
The Court established the fact that the boundary between these two States
is defined by the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness of L0
August 1955 between Libya itself and the French Republic. The party to
that Treaty became Chad in succession to France since its independence,
which occurred on 11 August 1960. The Court found inter alia that:
"...in this case, it is Libya, an original party to the Treaty, rather
than a successor State, that contests the resolution of the territorial
or boundary question. Hence there is no need for the Court to
explore matters which have been discussed at length before it such
as the principle of uti possidetis and the applicability of the Decision
adopted by the Organization of African Unity at Cairo in 1964."30
Notwithstanding the ahove statement, also observed in this case was
uti possidetis as existing on 11 August 1960, the date of independence of
Chad.
The above problem of the lapse of time seems to be not so acute in
case of successor States of the three former Communist F ederations in
Central and Eastern Europe. Most of these States are eager to settle all
problems of their delimitations with the neighbouring successor States as
soon as possible and on the basis of uti possidetis as existing in 1991 or
L992.
On the other hand, in emancipation of new States in Latin America
and Africa, prior to their independence these former colonies enjoyed very
Iittle or no autonomy at all, and usually had no local self-governing bodies
distinct from colonial administration. Un1ike them, the three Communist
Federations have recently dissolved into their constitutive parts within
their actual frontiers. Besides, before their independence all these entities
possessed their own legislative, judicial and executive power. In the former
Yugoslavia the Repubiics and Autonomous Provinces had their own local
police forces.
!F
Having all above in mind, and in particular the former arbitral and
judicial decisions in application of the principle of uti possidetis, the
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following hierarchy of these former acts could be established as relevant
at the date of succession of States:
1. Among them the most important are acts issued by the supreme
authority of the predecessor State. In case of the dispute between Burkina
Faso and MaIi, it was said that: "...from the beginning of the century up
to the entry into force of the French Constitution of 27 October L946,
the territorial administration of French West Africa was centralized. It
was headed by a governor-general, and was divided into colonies: the power
to create or abolish these belonged to the executive in Paris...".3l
In case of the former Yugoslav F ederation, of such relevance would be
the provisions of the latest 1974 Federal Constitution, and then the acts
of competent Federal bodies according to that Constitution, in respect to
the delimitation among Republics on one part, and them and Autonomous
Provinces on the other.32
In case that there were several acts of this kind, of decisive importance
is the latest one issued by the supreme authority if derogating those
preceding it. The acts of the supreme State authority have pre-eminence
over the acts of central executive, military or other power.33
If such an act has described the demarcation line with geographic
coordinates and annexed a map as its integral part, there should not be
any dispute on borderlines. Acts of this kind are, however, rare in practice
and disputes are even then possible on their interpretation, especially if
the description of the delimitation line does not fully correspond to the
physical situation on the ground.
2. OnIy in absence of acts of the supreme authority, important for
delimitation can be agreements of local authorities within former territorial
entities on their delimitation. They are supposed to be of particular
importance if concluded between member States of a demised Federation
31 lbid., p.569, para.3l. Although highly centralized, the Spanish Colonial administration
in Central America was up to 1821 even more complicated. Beside being "provinces" (Alcaldias
Mayores, Intendencios), El Salvador and Honduras were parts of the same Captaincy-General
or Kingdom of Guatemala. There were the ecclesiastical jurisdictions, which were supposed
to be followed by the territorial jurisdiction of the main civil administrative units. In addition
to it, after 1821, the five States became united by the Constitution of 1824 into the Federal
Republic of Central America, which lasted until 1839.
32 There was an important restriction prescribed by paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 5
of that Constitution, that the territories and boundaries of the Republics and Autonomous
Provinces couid not be altered without their consent. Although no decision in this respect
had been made in practice, a decision to this end by the Federal Assembly within the above
constitutional restriction should prevail over the same direct agreement between respective
Republics and/or Autonomous Provinces.
33 In delimitations between States in South and Central America the matter was of
former Spanish Royal Decrees as in force in 1810 and 1823 respectively. In modern times
they are usually legislative acts of the predecessor State.
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which previously enjoyed a high level of territorial autonomy. Such
agreements, if ratified or confirmed by the legislative power of both these
entities, prevail over those concluded by executive, police or some other
local authorities.
3. In absence of explicit agreements on the local level, the actual
demarcation line as existing at the date of succession of States should be
ascertained on the basis of the exercise of jurisdiction by local authorities
from both sides.34
When the matter specifically concerns the delimitations between two
former member States of a Federation, it should be reiterated that neither
in these situations is unilateralism a valid title for acquisition of a part
of territory. Unilateral exercise of territorial jurisdiction is of legal importance
only if there is some evidence that the opposite side has approved its
Iimits, or has not effectively opposed it (tacitus cotlserlsus). The basis thus
Iies again in a kind of agreement to be reached at a local level. Therefore,
a unilateral exercise of the acts of power in absence of this element of
express or tacit consent by the opposite party, is legally irrelevant.
A party which invokes an agreement of this kind in favour of its
territorial claims carries a heavy burden to prove the consent by the
opposite side. The opposite party can deny the existence of such a tacit
agreement either by former acts of refutal or of express protests against
acts by the other party, or by effective exercise of powers by the local
authorities belonging to its territory. Of importance can be acts of local
or communal executive, or police, or other bodies. Essential is, however,
the fact that these acts of power were exercised by official bodies and not
in excess or in abuse of their normal jurisdiction.
When evidences contradict one another, or if both parties exercised the
jurisdiction over the same territory - a situation which is not frequent in
practice - the disputed territory should be set apart from the others on
which an agreement on delimitation has been reached. The parties could
then either agree on an equitable apportionment of that disputed territory
among them or to defer the dispute to an arbitral or judicial procedure
for a final decision.
It must be stressed again that unilateral acts of power are in themselves
34 In the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso[\dali) of 1986, the Chamber of the Court took
into consideration the "colonial effectiuitds", i.e. "the conduct of administrative authorities as
proof of the effective exercise of territorial jurisdiction in the region during the colonial
period". Cf., I.C.J.Reports 1986, p.586, para.63. In the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Dispute (El SalvadorftIonduras) of 1992, in absence of any legislative materials of the Spanish
Crown, the Chamber of the Court took into consideration "formal title-deeds to commons"
("titles officiels de tercains conlrlunantx") as being colonial effectiuitds. The matter was of the
grants of particular lands to individuals or to Indian Communities as "titles" "in a third
municipal-law sense". Cf., I.C.J.Reports 1992, p.389, para.45.
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never a valid title of sovereignty. The valid title lies in the tacit consent,
if one party can at least prove the passivity of the opposite side in relation
to its own acts of power. In all other circumstances unilateral acts can
be an argument for denial of claim of existence of a tacit agreement by
the other party. This seems to be the core of the dispute between Croatia
and Slovenia.
What should be discussed in this context is the probative force of
various kinds of cartographic materials in territorial disputes. In a number
of cases involving land and maritime delimitation the parties produced to
the impartial body a variety of maps or their collections, or sketches of
maps, issued before the acquisition of their independence either by official
bodies of the former administrative power, or by private publishers. The
delimitation lines and toponymy in many of these maps are vague or
contradictory. The written and oral judicial procedure is sometimes excessively
protracted due to the efforts of the parties to prove the delimitation line
on the basis of maps.
On the basis of abundant former practice, the Judgment of the Chamber
of the Hague Court of 1986 in the Frontier Dispute (Burkina FasoMali),
has in this respect defined a principle of a broader scope:
"...maps can still have no greater legal value than that of
corroborative evidence endorsing a conclusion at which a court has
arrived by other means unconnected with maps. In consequence,
except when the maps are in the category of a physical expression
of the will of the State,3s they cannot in themselves alone be treated
as evidence of a frontier, since in that event they would form an
irrefutable presumption, tantamount in fact to legal title. The only
value they possess is as evidence of an auxiliary or confirmatory
kind, and this also means that they cannot be given the character
of a rebuttable or juris tantum presumption such as to effect a
reversal of the onus of proof."36
AII the above should apply mutatis mutandis to limits of cadastre
districts, as evidence of auxiliary or confirmatory kind in determination of
land frontiers, especially between Croatia and Slovenia. The practical
35 The Chamber has explained that situation at another place of the same Judgment:
"...This is the case, for example, when maps are annexed to an official text of which they
form an integrai part. Except in this clearly defined case, maps are only extrinsic evidence
of varying reliability or unreliability which may be used, along with other evidence of a
circumstantial kind, to establish or reconstitute the real facts." LC.J. Reports 1986, p.582,
para.54.
36 lbid, p.583, para.56.
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advantage of these limits lies in their precision, but nothing more than
that.
The limits of cadastre districts will most often correspond with limits
of effective exercise of power by local authorities in an area. When it is,
however, clear that one of parties has unilaterally extended the limits of
its cadastre district and that other acts of delimitation or of effective
exercise of power do not correspond with these limits, they have the same
probative value as maps. They only reverse the onus of proof on the party
which denies these limits, but are not in themselves the legal title of
sovereignty.
Finally, in cases involving th" -;itime delimitations in the process of
State succession one cannot avoid the discussion of the legal status of the
Gulf of Fonseca on the Pacific side of Central American Isthmus.
Two judicial pronouncements have confirmed that the GuIf of Fonseca
is a historic bay. The coasts on it have Nicaragua, Honduras and El
Salvador. Only Nicaragua and El Salvador have'their coasts at its entrance,
the width of which between Punta Ampala (El Salvador) and Punta
Cosigiiina (Nicaragua) is L9.75 nautical miles.
The Chamber of the Hague Court in the Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute of 7992 has confirmed the main findings of the Judgment
of the Central American Court of Justice of 9 March L9L7,lt and translated
them into terms of the modern law of the sea.
The Gulf was discovered in L522 and the Spanish Crown thereafter
exercised continuous and peaceful sovereignty over it until the three present
riparian States gained their independence in 1821. However, until 1839
the Gulf was under the sway of the Federal Republic of Central America,
the member States of which were also Guatemala and Costa Rica.
There is no evidence suggesting that prior to, or in L82t, as far their
waters were concerned, anything existed analogous to the boundaries of
provincial sway between Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. It was not
until June 1900 that Nicaragua and Honduras agreed on a partial maritime
boundary between them which stopped short of the waters of the main
entrance to the bay. That boundary was recognized by both subsequent
Judgments. Other parts of its maritime spaces have remained undivided.
On the basis of these facts, in l-917 the Central American Court ruled




original Spanish text of that Judgment was translated into English and published
Journal of International Law 1917 ('NILL"), pp.674-730.
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closed sea".38 By "closed sea" the Court seemed to mean simply that it is
not a part of the high seas, and its waters are not international waters.39
In L9l7 the Court recognized the maritime belt of 1 marine league (g
nautical miles) from the coast to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of
each coastal State.aO And the Court then took note of existence of the
1900 Honduras and Nicaragua agreed boundary line.
On all other waters of the Gulf of Fonseca the three riparian States
of El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua were "recognized as co-owners".41
The legal situation of that GuIf is, therefore, that of condominium, although
"that might be more aptly to be called co-imperium", as the Chamber of
the Hague Court rightly remarked in L992.42 In 1917 the Central American
Court called these waters beyond the three mile zorte, somewhat confusingly
the "territorial waters". They should now be called joint "internal" or
"national" waters.43
The 1917 Judgment has stressed that all waters of the Gulf that "belong
to the three States that surround them" are subject to "the right of uso
inocente over these waters" by "the merchant ships of all nations".44 This
right of innocent passage relates also and o fortiori to the waters outside
the maritime belt of 3 miles of exclusive jurisdiction of these three States.
The Chamber of the Hague Court commented in Lgg2:
"Thus the ratio decidendi of the 1917 Judgment appears to be
this: there was, at the time of independence, no delimitation between
the three countries; and while the absence of delimitation does not
always result in community, the undelimited waters of the Gulf
remained undivided in a state of community, which entails a
condominium or co-ownership of these waters...".45
There has been no attempt to divide and delimit these waters according
to the principle of uti possidetis juris ever since L821. And as the Chamber
concluded in 1992: "...Ajoint succession of the three States to the maritime
areas seems in these circumstance to be the logical outcome of the principle
38 A,JIL, p.693.
39 Cf., I.C.J. Reports 1992, p.591, para.390.
40 AJIL, p.694. In addition it recognized the
of rights of inspection and the exercise of police
security, ibid.
4L A,IIL, p.716.
42 Cf., LC.J. Reports 1992, p.597, para.399.
43 lbid., p.592, para.392.
44 AJIL, p.715.
45 I.C.J. Reports 1992, p.599, para.401.
further zone of 9 nautical miles as a zone
power for fiscal purposes and for national
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of uti possidetis juris itself."46
In 1992 the Chamber of the Hague Court had as its task to determine
the legal situation of the maritime areas outside the Gulf of Fonseca, and
it had to apply the rules of the modern law of the sea. It confirmed the
findings of the LgtT Judgment that the legal situation of the landward
side of the closing line at the main entrance of the Gulf is one of joint
sovereignty. The 3 mile belt belonging to each of the riparian States is,
however, not their "territorial sea" in the modern sense. "That a State
cannot have two territorial seas off the same littoral is manifest".47
All three coastal States are, however, entitled to their territorial sea,
continental shelf and exclusive economic zorte outside the Gulf. Outside
the straight baseline between Punta Ampala and Punta Cosigtiina, El
Salvador and Nicaragua have each respectively 3 mile zones of their own
territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone.
In respect of the rest of that line (13,75 miles):
"...the entitlement to territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive
economic zor,e seaward of the central portion of the closing line
appertains to the three States of the Gulf, EI Salvador, Honduras
and Nicaragua; and... any delimitation of the relevant maritime areas
is to be effected by agreement on the basis of international law".48
The Chamber previously found that the parties have not conferred upon
it jurisdiction to effect any delimitation of maritime spaces within or
outside the Gulf.ae
That would be in short the previous jurisprudence which should be
taken into account by any impartial international jurisdiction delimiting
maritime boundaries of new States in the process of State succession.
THE MARITIME BOUNDARY WITH SLOVENIA
It should be stressed that the legal situation between Croatia and
Slovenia is quite different from that of Serbia and the FRY with other
successor States until quite recently, and especially with Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both Croatia and Slovenia fully recognize to each other
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sovereignty. They have maintained full diplomatic relations ever since their
independence.
Both of them unilaterally assumed some legal commitments as the basis
of prompt settlement of all boundary issues. Both proclaimed their
independence and sovereignty at the same date of 25 June 1991 within
existing frontiers and borderlines with foreign States and with other
Yugoslav Republics. Both of them subsequently suspended their declarations
of independence for three months. The date of the succession of States
in respect of both of them is the same: 8 October 1991.
Subsequently Croatia, as well as Slovenia, assumed some additional legal
obligations to the same end. As being a condition for their recognition by
the member States of the European Community they undertook to "respect
(...) the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful
means and by common agreement". And finally, on becoming participating
States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe they
assumed inter alia the obligations from the Declaration on Principles in
the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, especially those concerning inviolability of
frontiers and territorial integrity of other participating States.S0
These commitments are tantamount to renunciation of any territorial
claims and to adoption of the principle of uti possidetis as existing on 8
October 1991, as the universal basis for settlement of all their territorial
problems.
For this reason, unless proved to the contrary, it would be wrong to
presume the existence of a dispute on land frontiers between Croatia and
Slovenia. There could only be the matter of a minor disagreement over
the course of the boundary between the two former Socialist Republics,
which on 8 October 1991 became a frontier protected by international law.
At issue is still the point of intersection of that international frontier at
the coast of the Bay of Pirano, but no party denies the other party's
sovereignty over a fraction of that coast.
Because there were no enactments on maritime delimitations between
the coastal Socialist Republics within the former Yugoslav Federation, the
principle of uti possidetis is of no use in that respect. The new maritime
frontier is to be established at sea. However, as already emphasized, both
Slovenia and Croatia are parties to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Continuous Zone (hereafter: "the 1958 Geneva
Convention"), as well as of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention
(hereafter: "the 1982 Convention").
50 Cf,, more precise data - V.D.DEGAN:
Slovenijom" /Some legal issues of the boundary
fahulteta Sueuiiliita u Rijeci 1995, pp.L-2.
"Neka pravna pitanja utwdivaqja granica sa
delimitation with Slovenia/, Zbornih Praunog
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In addition, it could be asserted that all impersonal norms provided in
one of 1958 Geneva Conventions, which were subsequently enshrined in
the 1982 Convention, have transformed into customary rules of general
international law.51 As such they are of universal application and are
binding on third States as well.
In this light the following claim raised by Slovenia during the bilateral
negotiations with Croatia seems to be quite inappropriate:
"...The Republic of Slovenia supports the preservation of integrity
of the Bay of Pirano under its sovereignty and jurisdietion, as well
as its pass to the high seas according to admissible criteria of
international law and respecting the specific situation of the Republic
of Slovertia."52
In this wording two different claims were in fact formulated, which
must be discussed separately.
*
The first claim relates to all maritime areas of the Bay of Pirano. It
is in contradiction with the existing law and the provisions of the 1958
Geneva Convention and of the L982 Convention, on three grounds:
1. In conformity with the above general principle that it is land that
confers upon the coastal State a right to the waters off its coast, a rule
concerning all bays has been universally recognized from the times
immemorial. According to that rule only waters of a buy, the coast of
which (including its mouth) belongs to a single State, may be considered
as internal waters of that State. This rule is confirmed by paragraph 1
common to Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention and to Article 10 of
the 1982 Convention, concerning bays.53
2. The above means a contrario that wherever two or more States
51 In this respect the Conclusion 12 of the Resolution on "Problems arising from a
succession of codification conventions on a particular subject", adopted by the Institute of
International Law at its Lisbon Session on lst September 1995, confirms as follows: "The
repetition in two or more codification conventions of the substance of the same norm may
be an important element in establishing the existence of that norm as a customary rule of
general international law."
52 Quoted, Vladimir IBLER: "DrZa,rna granica na moru izmedu Republike Hrvatske i
Republike Slovenije" /Boundary at sea between Croatia and Slovenial, Zbornik Praunog fahulteta
u Zagrebu 1994, No.5-6, p.470.
53 It is said in both texts: "This article relates only to bays the coasts of which belong
to a single State". Then follow more specific conditions of geographic nature which should
aII be fulfilled in the Bay of Pirano if all its coasts belong only to Croatia or only to
Slovenia. These provisions were expressly invoked, as expressing general customary law in
respect of "single State bays", by the Chamber of the Hague Court. Cf., Land, Island and
Maritime Frontier Dispute, I.C.J. Reports 1-992, p.588, para.383.
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possess their fractions of coast, each of them is entitled to its own territorial
sea in such a bay. There is no doubt as to the rule on delimitation of
the territorial sea in these situations. That rule is enshrined in the same
wording in Article L2 (1) of the 1958 Geneva Convention and in Article
15 of the L982 Convention. In the latter provision it reads as follows:
"Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each
other, neither of the two States ls entitled,, failirug agreenxent between
them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median
line euery point of which is equidistant from, the nearest points on
the baselines from which the breqdth of the territorial seas of each
of the two States ls measured. The aboue prouision. does not apply,
howeuer, where it ls necessary by reason of historic title or other
special circumstances to delimit the territorial seus of the two States
in. a wq,y which is at uariance therewith."
This provision - which as a treaty obligation is binding on both Slovenia
and Croatia - is of the nature of jus dispositiuum. lt provides the median
line as obligatory, with three possible exceptions. The first exception should
be the agreement of respective parties to the contrary, which in the case
of the Bay of Pirano does not exist. The second exception should be a
possible historic title, and the third: "other special circumstances".
3. For the reasons stated above, the historic rights if any, cannot entitle
one coastal State to possess all maritime areas in a bay in which two or
more States have their coasts. Therefore, the historic title is provided in
the above rule on delimitation of the territorial sea only as an exception
to the delimitation by median line.
Under all other circumstances the historic title can only create
"co-ownership" or co-imperium in favour of all coastal States, on the example
of the Gulf of Fonseca.s4 Any third solution should be in obvious violation
of the fundamental legal principle that it is only land which confers upon
all coastal States a right to waters off their respective coast. Such solution,
as claimed by Slovenia, is neither known in previous practice of international
courts and tribunals, nor was adopted by any treaty on maritime delimitations
between coastal States.
The question is however: is there any aspect in the precedent of the
Gulf of Fonseca that could be invoked in favour of the Slovene claim,
and can Slovenia really base its claim on a historic title?
The similarities between the Gulf of Fonseca and the Bay of Pirano
54 In its previous Judgment of 30 September 1916, the Central American Court had
established the same condominium of coastal States of Costa Rica and Nicaragua over the
Bay of San Juan del Norte on the Atlantic side and the Bay Salinas on the Pacific side of
the Central American isthmus. Cf,, AJIL 1917, pp.Lgl-229.
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lie only in the fact that there is no evidence in both instances suggesting
that for their waters prior to the "critical date" there was anything analogous
to boundaries between the territorial entities which subsequently became
independent States.
In case of the GuIf of Fonseca there was no attempt by its three
coastal States to delimit its waters even after 1821 and until 1900, on
any basis whatsoever. As a consequence, the historic title of "co-ownership"
appeared until 1917 as "the logical outcome of the principle of uti possidetis
juris itself'.
In case of the Bay of Pirano it is Croatia which ever since the beginning
of negotiations in t992 has insisted on its delimitation by agreement. It
is therefore quite obvious that the Bay of Pirano could in such short
period as between 1991 and 1995 not become a historic bay, as seen on
the example of the Gulf of F onseca.
A more essential difference is, however, that in the historic bay which
is the Gulf of Fonseca, all of its three coastal States have a 3 mile belt
of their exclusive rights, while the rest of its waters is jointly "co-owned"
by all of them. Slovenia invokes its alleged "historic rights" just to exclude
Croatia from any waters in the Bay of Pirano off its coast and to appropriate
aII its maritime areas for itself alone.
Moreover, an historic title of Slovene sovereignty in the Bay of Pirano
could not appear so far in any circumstances. It is only since 8 October
1991 that Slovenia has been a sovereign State, and it is only since that
date that an international frontier has appeared in that Bay.55
Therefore, the length of time for prescriptive acquisition in favour of
a historic right of Slovenia could only begin at the date of its succession
of States. It could perhaps consolidate during fifty or so years onwards
of undisturbed exercise of its sovereignty. That is certainly not the case
because Croatia is from the beginning persistent in opposing Slovene
exclusive rights over that Bay, which could not be created for other reasons
as explained above.
4. Finally, in application of the above legal ruld on delimitation of the
territorial sea, Slovenia could probably be successful to obtain in a judicial
55 The Bay of Pirano belonged previously as a whole: to the Republic of Venice until
its end in 1797. Later on it belonged to Austria, France and after 1815 again to Austria.
In 1920 it became a part of Italy. According to the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty with Italy it
should have been a part of the "Free Territory of Trieste" which never came into existence.
It became a part of Yugoslavia on behalf of a Memorandum of Understanding of 1954. Since
that time it was shared by the two former Yugoslav Socialist Republics: Croatia and Slovenia.
But that was the Federation which through its Federal organs exercised the sovereignty on
its "coastal sea", i.e. its internal waters and territorial sea. Cf,, Article 281 (10) of the 1974
Federal Constitution.
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or arbitral procedure a delimitation line of waters of the Bay of Pirano
which would decline from the median line in its favour. An impartial body
could take into account as "special circumstances": the entire length of the
coastline of Croatia and Slovenia, the fact that on Croatian shore there
are no ports, and that its waters in the Bay are not of importance for
its fishing industry.
However, even on that account no impartial body could deny Croatia
a belt of territorial sea in that Bay beyond the low water line along its
coast.
On the basis of the existing law, including the 1958 Geneva Convention
and the t982 Convention, Slovenia has no right to obtain more in the
Bay of Pirano.
The second Slovene claim is of even more intransigent nature. It takes
into account the geographic situation of the Bay of Pirano and of all
Slovene ports located on its coast in the Gulf of Trieste. AII ships navigating
to or from these ports must pass through the territorial sea either of
Croatia or of ltaly. The safety of navigation requires, however, their passage
through the Croatian territorial sea near the mouth of that Bay.
Slovenia claims from Croatia a strip of Croatia's own territorial sea
reaching the area of the high seas in the Adriatic. The precedent of the
Gulf of Fonseca does not give any support to this Slovene claim. The
entrance of the Bay of Pirano is not wider than 1.57 nautical miles (2.9
km.). Therefore, even if this entrance remains undelimited, its perpendicular
projection opposes at a very short distance the Italian territoriai sea.
Slovenia claims, however, a pass to the high seas through the Croatian
territorial sea in the south-west direction from the mouth of the Bay of
Pirano.
This strip would cut Croatian territorial sea into two parts where it
borders with the territorial sea of Italy in the Northern Adriatic. And
because Italy, Croatia, Montenegro and Albania are entitled to proclaim
their exclusive economic zones and thus to eliminate the regime of the
high seas in all the Adriatic, Slovenia could probably later on claim a
strip of exclusive economic zotte, again at the expense of Croatia.
That Slovene claim is equally in obvious contradiction with the above
general principle that it is only land that confers upon a coastal State a
right to waters off its coast.
Finally, a question might be posed: whether a judicial decision based
on equity could remedy the unfavourable geographic situation of Slovenia?
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The Hague Court has in respect of "equitable considerations" in delimitations
of continental shelf, stated the following:
"Equity does not necessarily imply equality. There can never be
any question of completely refashioning nature, and equity does not
require that a State without access to the sea should be allotted an
area of continental shelf, any more that there could be a question
of rendering the situation of a State with an extensive coastline
similar to that of a State with a restricted coastline. Equality is to
be reckoned within the same plane, and it is not such natural
inequalities as these that equity could remedy..."56
AII these arguments apply a fortiorl to possible claims of parts of the
territorial sea adjacent to the coast of a neighbouring State. If this Slovene
claim is supposed to be lawful and equitable, then even Austria, Hungary
and other land-locked States would be entitled to their own strips of
territorial sea belongtng now to Croatia or to Italy, or to both. But in
such an event these land-locked States could on the same ground claim
a part of the territorial sea actually belonging to Slovenia.
For all the above reasons, this Slovene claim should also be refuted in
any impartial procedure.S7
There are several similar situatr"rl, o, ports where all ships must pass
through the territorial sea belongrng to third States. That is the case of
the Belgian port of Antwerp since 1863. AII waters en route to that poft,
located at the mouth of the river of Scheldt, belong to the Netherlands.
Such is also the case of the Israeli port of Eilat and Jordanian port of
Aquaba which are located at the end of the Gulf of Aquaba. The coasts
of the GuIf belong, however, to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. And finally, big
American ports situated at the Great Lakes - Chicago, Detroit and others
- are connected with the high seas by the Canadian St.Lawrence River
and St.Lawrence Seaway.
Never to our knowledge did Belgium, Israel, Jordan or the United
States claim a fraction of the territorial sea from the Netherlands, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia or Canada, respectively. The access to these ports is regulated
56 Cf., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany/Denmark and the Netherlands),
I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp.50-51, para.9l.
57 Because of its persistence, one should really doubt whether behind it Slovenia claims
a part of the Croatian territory in the Northern Istria. As already said, Slovenia like Croatia
renounced any territorial claims. But even if it did not do so, due to the Croatian opposition
to territorial changes, the principle of uti possidetis applies automatically.
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by the regime of innocent passage.SS
In exchange to some similar advantages, Croatia could perhaps agree
on some concessions to Slovenia. It could agree for instance on a special
regime of passage through its fraction of the territorial sea near the mouth
of the Bay of Pirano which can bear more likeness to the regime of the
transit passage than to that of the innocent passage. It could in addition
design a sea lane in that area. But that is all that Slovenia can expect.59
It seems finally that Slovene legal advisers did not convince their
political leadership of the unlawfulness of their claims and expectations
\ rith respect to maritime delimitation with Croatia. Something similar
happened in Serbia in November 1991. Then it was Serbia which proposed
three questions for opinions of the Arbitration Commission. When expecting
that the Commission will give right to its allegation on "internally drawn
demarcation lines between Croatia and Serbia, and between Serbia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina" as allegedly being irrelevant in international law,
the Serbian leadership proved its ignorance of the principle of uti possidetis,
and especially of its application in the Judgment of the Hague Court of
1986 on the Frontier Dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali.
THE PROBLEMS OF MARITIME DELIMITATIONS WITH ITALY
As stated above, the delimitation line of the continental shelf between
these two States has been established along the middle of the Adriatic
Sea by the 1968 Agreement between the former SFRY and Italy. And the
territorial sea with Croatia in the Northern Adriatic is delimited by the
Treaty of Osimo of 1975. Therefore, in this moment there are no open
issues of delimitations between these two States, which have the longest
coast in the Adriatic.
Italy, however, opposes the proclamation of the exclusive economic zotte
in all the Mediterranean. It has no legal basis for such opposition and it
could not even prevent Egypt and Malta to proclaim it. Almost all coastal
States at other enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, like the Black Sea, Ba]tic,
Caribbean, etc, have proclaimed such zones ur their exclusive fishing zones
58 See Articles 14 to 23 of the 1958 Geneva Convention and Articles 17 to 32 and 34
and 35 of the 1982 Convention.
59 Siovenia would certainly not have these problerns if in late 1990 it accepted a
Croatian offer for a Confederation of at least only these two forrner Yugoslav Republics. See
the text of that Draft Confederal Pact - "Nacrt ugovora o Jugoslavenskoj konfederaciji -
Savezu jugoslavenskih repub\ka", Politiih.a rnisao 1991, No.2 (Zagreb), pp.166-175. However,
in such an event it could not escape becoming, like Crr:atia, the victirn of a large-scale
Serbian aggression and destructions. It was a perfect right of Slovenia to become a fully
independent State, and thus inter alia to avoid all disasters t-rf the war. But as such it
cannot now acquire more rights than the international law provides for all other coastal
States in the world which are in the same geographic situation.
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up to 200 miles from baselines. Many States non-parties, and even
non-signatories, of the 1982 Convention have done it. Therefore, nobody
can deny the parties to that Convention to exercise all rights provided in
it in their favour.
As already said, the Croatian Maritime Code provides all necessary
stipulations on its exclusive economic zone which are in perfect accordance
with the L982 Convention. It is now expected that the Croatian Sabor
adopts a decision on its formal proclamation.
Upon the Croatian proclamation of the exclusive economic zo\e the
problem of its delimitation will arise, especially with Italy. Unlike the
above cited provision on delimitation of territorial sea, Article 74 of the
L982 Convention does not offer any criteria for such delimitation. Its
essential paragraph 1 reads as follows:
"The delimitatioru of the exclusiue economic zorle between States
with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by q,greenxent on the
basis of international law, as referced to iru Article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieue a.n equitable
solution."6o
Following the above wording, an agreement on delimitation is possible
only after all respective States proclaim their exclusive economic zones and
after they successfully accomplish negotiations to that end or refer the
case to an international court or tribunal for final decision.
Paragraph 4 of Article 74 however provides:
"Where there is an agreetrl,ent in force between the States concerned,
questions relating to the delimitation of the exclusiue economic zone
shall be determined in accordance with the prouisions of that agreement."
Croatia is right to interpret the Agreement of 1968 on delimitation of
continental shelf as "an agreement in force between the States concerned".
It is not right to consider that delimitation line as that of the exclusive
economic zone, but it should insist on it as the basis for negotiations, or
judicial settlement, on the future delimitation of the exclusive economic
zotle.
Croatia is equally right temporarily to enjoy its sovereign rights and
exercise jurisdiction up to the existing limit of the continental shelf, until
a new agreement with Italy on delimitation of their exclusive economic
zone is reached.
60 The Hague Court was
Shelf (Lrby"nUata) as follows:
to the method to be followed
is left to States themselves or
LC.J. Reports 7985, pp.30-31,
32
right in asserting in its Judgment of 1985 on the Continental
"The Convention sets a goal to be achieved, but is silent as
to achieve it. It restricts itself to setting a standard, and it
to the courts, to endow this standard with specific content...",
para.28.
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In case that Italy, in the meantime, corrects its straight baselines along
its Adriatic coast and by that pushes external limits of its territorial sea
to the middle of that Sea, Croatia is right to refuse any consequences of
such unilateral act for the future delimitation of the exclusive economic
zone. On such protest, a unilateral act of Italy of this kind will become
inopposable with respect to Croatia's rights. By such act Italy could in
any case not trespass the actual limit of the continental shelf. The same
relates to Croatia. Those Croatian lawyers who advocate the correction of
Croatia's own straight baselines, which exist since 1965 without Italian
protests, are unwise.
There are, however, strong reasons for all respective coastal States at
the Adriatic to proclaim their exclusive economic zones, thus eliminating
the regime of the high seas there.
According to the present general international law of the sea in force,
a coastal State has no jurisdiction over foreign tankers and other vessels
carrying noxious substances, when navigating in the high seas. It obtains
the jurisdiction to take and enforce measures against these ships only after
an accident has happened and actual or threatened damage with its harmful
consequences has occurred in its territorial sea or its coastline. One accident
of that kind is able to destroy all tourist industry at all Adriatic coasts
for many years ahead.
Upon proclamation of the exclusive economic zone by Croatia, Italy,
the FRY and Albania, according to Article 2Ll (6) of the 1982 Convention,
they could jointly adopt special mandatory measures for the prevention,
as well as joint regulations for the protection of pollution, in their respective
exclusive economic zones, territorial seas, ports and off-shore terminals.
This special regime could apply to all tankers and other ships from entering
the Adriatic Sea until their leaving it. The risk of pollution from tankers
could not be entirely eliminated by such monitoring, but it would certainly
be considerably reduced.
The regime of exclusive economic zorte in the Adriatic would be equally
favourable for the adoption of joint measures by all coastal States for the
purpose of conserving and managlng the living natural resources in it. It
is a self-evident fact that these resources are now over-exploited and that
year by year some precious stocks of fish in the Adriatic Sea are being
progressively reduced.
After the proclamation of this zorte it would be possible to reach
agreements on the allowable catch of the living resources in respective
exclusive economic zones of all coastal States, in order to ensure the
maintenance and restoration of populations of harvested species at levels,
which can produce the maximum sustainable yield on the basis of the
best scientific evidence available.
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Further oh, agreements could be reached on terms, conditions and
quotas of the catch of species of fish in exclusive economic zotte of each
coastal State, subject to payment. But during a transitional period after
the proclamation of that zone, the catch could be free of charge for any
fisherman from other Adriatic coastal States. In case that this competence
has been transferred by Italy to the European Union bodies, Croatia, the
FRY and Albania can negotiate with Brussels after Italy's proclamation of
this zone.
AII these multilateral arrangements are however not possible before the
respective coastal States at the Adriatic proclaim their exclusive economic
zones and acquire sovereign rights and jurisdiction that the 1982 Convention
provides in that zorre.
MARITIME BORDER WITH BOSNIA.HERZEGOVINA
Bosnia-Herzegovina has a small strip of coast of some 20 kilometers,
mainly including the tourist resort of Neum. That area is absolutely
unsuitable for the construction of a maritime port.
During the tragic war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, all foreign initiatives for
a prompt cessation of hostilities, and based on a repartition of that States
along ethnic lines, were connected with pressures on Croatia to cede parts
of its coast either to the self-proclaimed "Serbian Republic" or to a potential
Bosnian-Moslem entity. Even in this moment the "Serbian Republic" claims
the access to the sea, meaning by that term the acquisition of Croatian
coast.61
Hopefully, these pressures through "peace initiatives" came to an end
with the conclusion, within the 1994 Washington Agreements, of two
additional agreements between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. By the frrst Agreement Croatia committed itself to
Iease to the Federation a plot of land within its Port t f Plode which will
have the status of a free zone. Plode is connected by the main railroad
with Bosnia-Herzegovina. By the second Agreement the Federation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina will grant Croatia unrestricted transit by road through
61 By treaties of Karlowitz (Srijemski Karlovci) of 1699 and of Pasarowitz (PoZarevac)
of 1718, the Ottornan Empire got two accesses to the sea through its province of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. With Neum, it got a southern access at Sutorina in Boka Kotorska,
between the town of Igalo and the present frontier with Croatia. After the Second World
War, probably in 1947, Montenegro acquired Sutorina from Bosnia-Herzegovina in disrespect
of constitutional procedures. It is curious that the "Serbian Republic" does not elaim now
from the FRY that historic coast of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but is persistent in claiming territory
of the former Republic of Dubrovnik which never formed a part of any Serbian State and
which has no Serbian population. It is nevertheless clear that by the application of the
principle of uti possidetis as of 27 April 1992, the FRY, like Croatia, is not obliged to give
any territorial concessions even to this Serbian entity within the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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Neum, between the eastern and western borders of
Otherwise, there are no disputes over the frontier
in its coastal section at the Adriatic Sea.
Neum with Croatia.
of Bosnia-Herzegovina
THE MARITIME DELIMITATIONS WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF YUGOSI,AVIA
Unlike Slovenia, the FRY has not formally recognized the Republic of
Croatia and its frontiers so fal^, practically recognized by all other States
in the world. On the contrary, the former Federal Army occupied the
southern coast of Croatia and it kept the city of Dubrovnik besieged for
a certain period of time in 1991 and L992.
There were attempts to set apart that entire region from Croatia and
re-create the historic Republic of Dubrovnik which had existed until 1808.
At the same time, Montenegro repeated its claim on cape O5tro in the
extreme South of Croatia in order to dominate the mouth of Boka Kotorska.
The FRY still keeps open the question of borderlines with Croatia in that
sector, including the entire region of Konavle, south of Dubrovnik.
Neither Montenegro nor Serbia have rights to Konavle and on the cape
O5tro, on any ground. The area is entirely populated by ethnic Croats,
without Serbian or other minority groups. In the past it was never a part
of a Serbian or Montenegrin State. The Republic of Dubrovnik had bought
it from the Bosnian feudal Lord Sandalj Hranii in L4L9.62
The undisputable fact is that on 8 October 1991 Konavle, including
the cape O5tro, was a part of the former Yugoslav Socialist Republic of
Croatia. Therefore, the principle of uti possidetis of that date applies.
The point of delimitation between Croatia and Montenegro should be
the midpoint in the straight line between the said cape Oitro and the
Montenegrin islet of Mamula in the mouth of Boka Kotorska. From that
mark in the northern direction, (in the southern part of the gulfl, should
be drawn a delimitation line of territorial sea. To the south of it, a
delimitation line of the territorial sea should be drawn up to the distance
of 12 miles, and then a line of delimitation of continental shelf up to its
limit with Italy.
After both Croatia and the FRY proclaim their exclusive economic zones,
they should reach an agreement on its delimitation. If possible, it would
be best that the agreement on delimitation of continental shelf serves all
future purposes.
Due to unresolved problems in the State succession, there is a problem
62 See historic facts in - Josip LUCIC - Stijepo OBAD: Konauosha preulaha /Prevlaka
in the Konavle/, Dubrovnik 1994, especially pp.42-L50.
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of conventions in force between these two States.
The FRY pretends to its full identity with and continuity of the former
SFRY. It thus asserts that the old State has not disappeared. As a logical
consequence, it claims to be the party of all international agreements of
the former Federation. Among them are all four Geneva Conventions of
1958, and the 1982 Convention since its entry into force on 16 November
L994.
No other parties to multilateral conventions nor their depositaries, deny
the FRY that status of party to all of them, although very few of third
States recognize at the same time its identity and continuity with the
former SFRY.
That must be the position of Croatia. Although according to the Opinion
No.8 of the Arbitration Commission the SFRY does no longer exist, and
according to its Opinion No.10 "the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) is a
new State which cannot be considered the sole successor to the SFRY",03
Croatia is right to interpret the Declaration of the FRY of 27 April L992
that it as a new State assumed en bloc all open multilateral conventions
the party of which was at that date the former SFRY.
Therefore, the common conventional basis of Croatia and of the FRY
for delimitation of their maritime areas is the following: for the territorial
sea, the above cited text common to Article L2 (1) of the 1958 Geneva
Convention and to Article 15 of the 1982 Convention; for the exclusive
economic zot7e, the above cited Article 74 of the 1982 Convention; and
for continental shelf the same wording in Article 83 of the 1982 Convention
and perhaps in some aspects also Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf.
Furthermore, both parties have at their disposal numerous procedures
for settlement of disputes provided in Part XV of the L982 Convention.
The process of negotiations or of an arbitral or judicial settlement will
not be easy at all. Croatia should claim a median line for the delimitation
of the territorial sea but it cannot expect that a straight line in the same
direction should continue in the continental shelf, i.e. in exclusive economic
zor7e.
The special circumstance in the region is a deeply concave shape of
the Albanian coast near its land frontier with Montenegro. And as was
said in the 1969 Judgment of the Hague Court in the North Sea Continental
Shelf cq,sesl
"...account (shall be) taken for the purpose of the effects, actual
or prospective, of any other continental shelf delimitation between
36
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adjacent States in the same r€gion."64
To that end, the Arbitral Tribunal on maritime delimitation between
Guinea and Guinea-Bissau in its Award of l-985, has taken into account
not only the shape of coasts of these two neighbouring States, but also
of the West African Coast from the cape Almadies on the Senegalese coast
to the cape Schilling on the coast of Sierra Leone.65
Therefore, in delimitation of continental shelf and exclusive economic
zotte, neither can the FRY expect a median line with respect to A1bania,
nor can Croatia expect it with respect to the FRY.
In all maritime delimitations with adjacent and opposite coastal States,
the rights of Croatia can be endangered the most if Bosnia-Herzegovina





1969, p.55, para.101, (C), (3).
International Arbitral Awards, vol.XIX, pp.189-190, para.110 and 111.
37
V. D. Degan: Maritime Frontiers of the Republic of Croatia, IIpp v. 87., (1.-4.),7-Bg, (1gg5)
Saietuk
GRANICE REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE NA MORU
U ouoj raspraui izlaZ,u se propisi unutartljeg praua, biuie SFRJ i drugih obalnih
driaua na Jadranshorn nl,oru o njihouim morskim prostorima, zatim njihoii d,uostrani
sporazumi o morskim razgraniienjima, te njihouo sudjelouanje u mnogostranim
honuencijarna o prauu rnora, na "hritiini datum". Taj "hritiini datum", tj d,atum
sukcesije, za Hruatshu i Sloueniju je 8. listopad 1991, a za Saueznu Republiku
Jugoslauiju (SRJ) 27. trauanj 1992.
Potom se izlaZe dalji razuoj praua iz te oblasti u Hruatshoj i u ostalim jadranshim
drZauama. Hruatska je u suorne Pomorshom zahonihu iz 1994. preduidjela sue propise
o suonl,e gospodarskom pojasu ali je ostauljeno Saboru da ga naknadno proglasi.
Do danas ga nije proglasila niti jedna obalna drZaua na Jadranu. Sue te driaue
osim Albanije danas su stranhe Konuencije UN o prauu nlora iz 1g82.
U pojedirtostima se izlaie prauo primjenljiuo no. razgraniienja suih morshih
prostora, nastalo u rnedunarodnoj arbitraZnoj i sudshoj prahsi. Temeljno je prauno
prauilo u suim morskim razgraniienjima da hopno don4inira nl.orenl, tj. da je kopno
ono koje daje obalnoj drl,aui prauo na uode koje oplahuje njegoue obale.
Izlaiu se najuainije naznake naielo uti possidetis iz nouije medunarodne sudshe
i arbitraZne prahse, kaho u hopnenim taho i u morshim razgraniienjima. U
pojedinostima je opisan reiinr historijskog zaljeua Fonseca na srednjeameri\hoj
preulaci na home obale imaju Niharagua, Honduras il El Saluador. Reiim hondominija
suih triju obalnih drZaua uturden je presudom Centralnoameriihog sud,a iz 1917,
a poturden je i u presudi Vijeta Medunarodnog suda o Kopnenim, otoinirn i
morskim granicama iz 1992.
Na temelju toga praua razmatra se prauno neutemeljen zahtjeu Slouenije prenxa
Hruatshoj za suim morshim prostorima u Piranskom zaljeuu, te za njezin izlaz na
otuoreno n'tore hroz hruatsho teritorijalno nlore.
Izmedu Hruatshe i Italije sui su morski prostori razgraniieni temeljem ugouord
hoje je s tom driauom sklopila biuia SFRJ. Pitanje razgraniienja pojauit fu se
nakon ito obje dri,aue proglase suaka suoj gospodarshi pojas.
Izmedu Hruatshe i Bosne i Hercegouine glauna pitanja su. rijeiena duama
sporazunl.ima iz 1994. u okuiru Washingtonshih sporazunxa. Stranke su im Hruatsha
i Federacija Bosne i Hercegouine. Pruirn spordzunxonl. Hruatska se obuezala iznajrniti
Federaciji homad kopna u luci Ploie koji 6e imati poloZaj slobodne zone. Drugim,
holateralnim sporazlln'Lona, Federacija 6e Hruatskoj priznati neograniien tranzit cestom
kroz Neum, izmedu istoine i zapadne granice Neuma s Hruatshom.
Napohon, SRJ irna prauno neutemeljen teritorijalni zahtjeu prenxa Hruatskoj nad
rtom Oitro no. hrajnjem jugu hruatshe obale koga treba odbiti. Inaie sporazunx o
morshim granicama treba postiii od crte sredine tla fiioru, na ulazu u Boku
Kotorshu, izmedu rta Oitro i otoiiia Mamula. Od te toihe ualja odrediti teritorijalno
nlore uz hruatsku obalu u Boki Kotorshoj, d u praucu prem.a puiini treba odrediti
crtu razgraniienja teritorijalnog mora Hruatske i SRJ do udaljenosti od 12 morshih
milja. Nahon te udaljenosti, sue do ued uturdene granice epikontinentskog pojasa s
Italijom, treba odrediti granicu i toga pojasa izrnedu tih duiju driaua.
Pri razgraniienju epihontinentshog i gospodarskog pojasa trebat 6e kao "posebruu
oholnost" uzeti u obzir konhauan oblik obale Albanije u blizini granice so SRJ.
Usljed toga niti 6e SRJ prerna Albaniji, a niti Hruatsha preffi,a SRJ, modi ishoditi
crtu sredine.
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